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Abstract
In  this  article  we approach  SYRIZA's  electoral  success  between 2012 and 2015 as  a
movement effect. We focus on SYRIZA's features, strategy and message that have been
developed on the grounds of its movement activity, as well as on the external political
conditions which SYRIZA seems to take advantage of. We argue that the anti-austerity
campaign  created  the  necessary  preconditions  for  the  electoral  and  political  rise  of
SYRIZA,  namely  the  emergence  of  a  new political  boundary  between  pro-  and  anti-
Memorandum forces and a subsequent majoritarian socio-political category that could be
transformed into a privileged electoral pool for SYRIZA. 
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INTRODUCTION
SYRIZA was the winner of  25th January 2015 elections  obtaining  more than 36% and
securing  the  first  place  in  the  polls.  The  electoral  result  allowed  SYRIZA to  form a
coalition government along with ANEL, a rightist party which had secured less than 5%.
SYRIZA had seen its percentages rising from 4.5% in 2009 elections to 17% in May 2012
elections  and  27%  a  month  after.  How  these  results  became  possible?  It  must  be
considered only  as a product of  the economic crisis,  on the one hand,  and of  Alexis
Tsipras’ leadership and strategy, on the other (Moschonas 2013: 36)?
Electoral  consequences  of  this  type  indeed  must  be  attributed,  according  to
Hernandez and Kriesi, as a by-product of financial and economic crisis in Europe. More
precisely, the two authors argue that 1) the more hit is a country by the crisis, 2) the less
economic  hardship  it  has  experienced  in  the  recent  past,  3)  the  more  dramatic  the
unfolding key events are, the more is this country likely to see its ruling parties punished
by economic voting, especially in the second post-crisis elections (Hernandez and Kriesi,
2016).  Hernandez  and  Kriesi  combine  the  economic  voting  explanation  with  a  party
system restructuring explanation which relies upon the idea that the great recession may
accentuate  long  term trends  of  system  change,  destabilizing  further  party  systems  in
Europe in the detriment of mainstream ruling parties and on behalf of radical populist right
or left parties. Undoubtedly Greece witnessed all the aforementioned developments. On
the other hand, the extent of changes raises a new question: why SYRIZA, a leftist minor
party (and not another party on the left or on the right side of the political spectrum)
managed to reach governmental power (instead of seeing its percentages simply rise)?
A partial answer can probably be drawn from the distinction that Mair (Mair, 2011)
introduced according to which political parties are divided in mainstream parties who fulfill
the task of responsible government and peripheral parties who fulfill the task of popular
representation and give voice to challengers. This division of labor gives shape to long term
dealignment/realignment processes due to changing social conflicts. In this context Kriesi
argues  that,  «the  Great  Recession  may  constitute  a  ‘critical  juncture’  that  accelerates
and/or  reshapes  such  realignment  processes  in  the  party  system  giving  rise  to
extraordinary  punishments  to  mainstream  incumbents  which  may  turn  out  to  be
irreversible in the medium term» (Kriesi, 2015a:25-26). SYRIZA was a peripheral party
that  through providing  access to popular challengers and social  movements within  the
party system managed to gain political leverage. However, SYRIZA’s electoral success has
rather to do with challenging the division of labor between parties than trying to take
advantage of it. «The call to take governmental power, based on the unity of the entire left
[…] became an inspiring response to the widespread disenchantment of the population
with the long-standing bipartisan political system» (Spourdalakis, 2014:359). This call was a
December 2019, vol. 45
http://epublishing.ekt.gr | e-Publisher: EKT | Downloaded at 23/03/2020 06:09:58 |
MOVEMENT, PARTY AND ELECTORAL DYNAMICS                                                                                 186
part of a distinct strategy with three pillars: the «active participation in the social field»,
the  «complete  and  unreserved  presence  in  the  institutions  of  social  and  political
representation»  and  the  «development  of  a  program»  (Spourdalakis,  2014:358).  This
strategy, which has been characterized (Eleytheriou, Spourdalakis and Tsakiris, 2013) as an
«against  and  beyond»  strategy  in  comparison  with  the  Communist  Party  (KKE)’s
movement vanguardism and the moderate Democratic Left (DIMAR)’s governmentalism
leads us to the field of movement activity.
It  is  true  that  only  recently  social  movement  scholars  started  to  examine  more
systematically  the  interactions  between  social  movements  and  party  politics  (Almeida,
2010; Kriesi, 2015b; Hutter, Kriesi and Lorenzini, forthcoming), political cleavages (Hutter,
2014) or elections (Mc Adam and Tarrow 2010, 2013). Some Greek scholars have already
indicated the positive relation between protests and a new political cleavage (Aslanidis and
Marantzidis, 2016), a new electoral regime (Serdedakis and Koufidi, forthcoming) or the
rise of SYRIZA (Simiti, 2014; Karyotis and Rudig, 2017; Vogiatzoglou, 2017). In contrast,
Oikonomakis  disagrees with the latter,  arguing that there is no relation between «the
movement of the squares» and the rise of SYRIZA, given the widespread crisis of political
representation and critics  on the institutions  (parties included).  He claims that  people
protesting for many years turned once again to the electoral  arena,  not because they
trusted  parties  and  the  institutional  procedures,  but  because  «the  movement  of  the
squares»  failed  to  create  alternative  structures  (Oikonomakis,  2017).  However,  this
argumentation does  not  take into account that  the majority of  Greek Indignados was
protesting against austerity rather than claiming for direct/real democracy. Only left-wing
youth and antiauthoritarian/anarchist groups were really interested in prefigurative politics
and willing  to engage in a long-lasting  and/or costly  activity  that  would bring  such an
outcome. In contrast, the majority of participants, especially the elders, joined only the
most important protests and defected rapidly when they failed to stop Parliament's ballot
on Mid-term austerity program (Oikonomakis, 2017).
Part of the literature of social movements shows that, as Goldstone stresses it, «there
is only a fuzzy and permeable boundary between institutionalized and non-institutionalized
politics» (Goldstone, 2003:13). It is always crucial to think «electoral choices and protest,
mobilization by political parties and social movements” as parts of “the same process of
political interest intermediation» (Kriesi, 2015c:67). In this context, electoral, protest and
economic cycles are interrelated and quite often overlapping.  Of course, it seems that
«ordinarily, defiance is first expressed in the voting booth simply because, whether defiant
or not, people have been socialized within a political culture that defines voting as 
the mechanism through which political change can and should properly occur» (Piven &
Cloward, 1977: 15). 
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According to Karyotis and Rudig's research, «over 54% of those who demonstrated
against austerity between 2010 and 2015 voted for SYRIZA in the January 2015 elections»
(Karyotis  and  Rudig,  2017:8).  We believe  that  the  external  political  conditions  which
SYRIZA seems to take advantage of were the immediate results of an intensive movement
campaign,  while  both  the  party's  political  strategy  and  particular  ideological  and
organizational  features  are  developed  on  the  grounds  of  its  movement  activity.
Consequently, we approach the spectacular rise of SYRIZA as a movement effect and not
as  a  populist  phenomenon,  while  we address  the  issue  whether  its  electoral  success
contributed to the decline of mass mobilization. 
THE  ANTI-MEMORANDUM  MOVEMENT  CAMPAIGN  AND  THE
EMERGENCE OF A NEW POLITICAL CLEAVAGE 
As Kriesi notes, «voters resort to the protest arena to the extent that they are unable to
express themselves in the electoral or direct democratic channel or that their vote has no
impact» or simply «because the next elections are too far off» (Kriesi, 2015c: 68-69).  This
theoretical insight applies perfectly to the Greek case. Let’s have a look at the core data. In
2009 ruling New Democracy lost the snap elections on the grounds of the announcement
of  austerity  measures  by  Prime  Minister  Kostas  Karamanlis.  PASOK secured  an  easy
victory,  but  the  new Prime Minister  Papandreou  facing  an  ongoing  public  deficit  and
sovereign debt was led to sign the first bailout package with troika in 2010 in exchange of
unprecedented  austerity  measures.  This  decision  triggered  discontent  among  Greeks,
while it would be difficult for new elections to take place soon. Greek citizens chose to
protest, according to Kriesi’s point of view. Pursuant to our hypothesis, the unprecedented
anti-austerity campaign that followed not only had important impacts on institutional and
party level (Kousis, 2013; Kousis and Kanellopoulos, 2014) but, furthermore, gave shape
both to the electoral cycle and its outcomes.
More  specifically,  the  massive  political  dealignment/realignment  process  Greece
witnessed firstly in 2012 double elections (Voulgaris and Nikolakopoulos, 2014) and finally
in 2015 elections that brought SYRIZA to power cannot be explained without taking into
account a series of causal mechanisms occurred basically in the social movement level.
Protest  cycle that  opened up in spring 2010 was marked by intensive  conflict and its
geographical and sectoral diffusion (Psimitis, 2011), since tens of large protest events with
high number of participants and high number of parallel/synchronized events took place
across the country (Kousis  and Kanellopoulos,  2014).  In the course of this movement
campaign  a  broad  anti-austerity  coalition  including  at  least  5  distinct  networks  (trade
unions, SYRIZA’s organizations, KKE and its frontal organizations, ANTARSYA’s network,
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anarchist groups) was formed (Kanellopoulos et al, 2017). Traditional boundaries between
these  distinct  networks  lost  salience  on  behalf  of  a  new  political  cleavage:  anti-
memorandum vs pro-memorandum forces (Papanikolopoulos et al, 2014).
This  boundary change (McAdam et al, 2001) resulted from the increasing  polarization
between the ruling mainstream parties on the one hand and a wide range of hard-hit
social groups along with the (mostly left wing and trade unions) political opposition on the
other. Political climate was so polarized that pro-memorandum forces resorted to open
propaganda (Doxiades, 2016) and repression. This strategy triggered a «backlash effect»
deepening even more the new cleavage.  Competition across the lines was combined with
convergence (McAdam et  al,  2001)  among  different  components  of  every  single  bloc.
Convergence  between  previously  political  opponents  was  based  on  the  exposition  in
common threats, on the coexistence in the same protest events as well as on a more or
less common framing (Papanikolopoulos et al, 2014). For years brokers acted in order to
connect  previously  unconnected  individuals  and  groups,  while  common diagnostic  and
prognostic  frames  (Benford  and  Snow,  2000)  tended  to  get  formed  via  a  «bridging»
process (Snow, Rochford, Worden and Benford, 1986) between a left-wing framing and a
patriotic  one.  This  inclusive  message  became a  winning  discursive  formula  widely  and
rapidly diffused. Figure 1, which presents an explanatory schema McAdam, Tarrow and
Tilly (2001:323) introduced in order to explain polarization, depicts the complex process
through which the «anti-memorandum» socio-political category emerged.  
Without the formation of this new majoritarian socio-political category that could be
transformed (at least in part) in a massive electoral pool for SYRIZA, the spectacular rise
of the latter seems impossible.  «Social  categorization» process may prevent somebody
from get exposed to an active minority's influence, if he/she believes they don't share the
same  category  (Papastamou  and  Prodromitis,  2016:108).  Consequently,  SYRIZA's
perception as part of an inclusive category wider than the traditional political ones was a
critical step. In that sense, perceiving anti-memorandum campaign as an opening of the
«structure of political opportunities» (Eleftheriou et al, 2013:7) for new political outcomes
seems to us  an important  assumption.  Especially  Greek Indignados  protests  facilitated
voter  defection  from  the  traditional  two-party  system,  strongly  delegitimizing
governmental  parties  and  legitimizing  participating  anti-memorandum  political  forces
(Eleftheriou,  2015).  Deactivation  of  boundaries  and  convergence  between  previously
oppositional forces as well as the creation of a new boundary between them and the pro-
bailout  socio-political  bloc resulted to the emergence of  a  social  category and a  new
political cleavage, yet not to a major new actor. Movements, as Castells puts it, «can hardly
be co-opted by political parties (which are universally distrusted), although political parties
may profit from the change of mind provoked by the movement in the public opinion. […]
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they  can  also  be  public  opinion  movements,  with  electoral  consequences  Castells,
2012:227). It seems that this is the case under examination.
Figure 1
 Polarization process
Common threats/opportunities
                    Competition                                                        Brokerage/Diffusion
           Category formation
McAdam and Tilly 2001:323
SYRIZA BETWEEN CONTENTION AND CONVENTION 
From the beginning of the previous decade SYRIZA and KKE decided to turn to social
movements in order to increase their political leverage (Tsakatika and Eleftheriou, 2013).
Thus, they increased human, technical, economic and, of course, political resources that
traditionally provided social movements.  Parties of the Left in Greece were historically
something more than institutional allies of social movements: they were their main carriers
(Papanikolopoulos 2015b, 2016). SYRIZA’s and KKE’s decision to actively participate in the
popular anti-austerity campaign, apart from confirming that «left is more likely to rely on
public protest outside of the party system than the right» (Kriesi, 2015b:672), transformed
the  two  leftist  parties  into  parliamentary  spokesmen  of  the  anti-austerity  movement
forces. 
According to Giugni and Lorenzini’s assumption «contentious reactions to economic
crises are more likely when oppositional parties succeed in framing the crisis in terms of
specific responsibilities of the government» (Giugni and Lorenzini, 2015:24). True, from the
beginning of crisis it was predominantly parties of the Left (SYRIZA and KKE) who blamed
Greek  government  for  its  performance  in  crisis  management  (Sommer  et  al,  2016).
Movement  actors  engaged  in  the  same  blame  game  (Kanellopoulos  et  al,  2015).  As
Kanellopoulos  et  al’s  research  indicates  parties  of  the  Left,  left-wing  social  movement
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organizations and trade unions were sharing both diagnostic and prognostic frames in a
crucial  degree (Kanellopoulos  et  al,  2014).  In  other  words,  oppositional  forces  were
speaking with one voice from the very beginning and their common narrative was drawn
from an  ideological  compatibility.  In  this  context,  the  hypothesis,  according  to  which
SYRIZA adopted  unilaterally  the  discourse  of  protesters  (Karyotis  and  Rudig,  2017:8;
Prentoulis and Thomassen, 2014:227; Aslanidis and Marantzidis, 2016:149) is not valid. In
contrast,  SYRIZA  contributed  actively  in  the  formation  of  the  anti-memorandum
discursive formula, due to its theoretical and practical elaborations and the expertise of its
economists  and  other  academic  party  members,  as  well  as  by  the  articulation  of
parliamentary, trade unions and protest oppositional narrative.
However,  SYRIZA  and  KKE  did  not  adopt  the  same  option  of  «social  movement
partyism» (Almeida,  2010).  Contrary  to  KKE’s  movement  vanguardism1,  SYRIZA
combined movement  to  governmental  concerns2(Eleftheriou,  Spourdalakis  and  Tsakiris,
2013). Furthermore, SYRIZA’s  (and especially its Youth branch)  unreserved presence in
almost  all  protest  events  along  with  its  decision to avoid  patronizing  spontaneity  and
innovations of the movements (Spourdalakis, 2014:358) 3, offered it a «degree centrality»
(Krinsky and Crossley, 2014: 12) in the sense that it had not a key-connecting role (a
«betweeness centrality»), but disposed many connections to others, inclusive framing, and
position in the overlapping area between moderates and radicals  (Kanellopoulos  et al,
1 KKE in specific social sectors (e.g. labor, student, women etc.) tries to create frontal organizations
under its control and guidance, while it avoids cooperation with other political forces on the grounds of
political purity.
2 We read in the political resolution of SYRIZA’s first Congress (12 July 2013): “SYRIZA is acting in line
with social  movement and popular claims in order to fully contribute in the development of a massive
multifaceted social movement repelling governmental attack […] forming at the same time the preconditions
of a huge social and political overthrow. Government of the Left will come as a result of this huge popular
mobilization and initiative”. 
3 In the beginning of Indignados protests, Alexis Tsipras in his speech in a meeting of SYRIZA's central
political committee (28 May 2011) described in detail the party's strategy in respect with popular reactions:
“Dynamics of massive social resistance made its presence felt and this is important. Apparently, we cannot
turn our back to all these people in an elitist and sectarian way. The logic, according to which whatever we
do not control is mistaken and suspected, is totally wrong. It' s not our logic. And apparently, it is neither
possible nor in line with our perception for the mass movements any patronizing of these people […]. We
must participate into these struggles. In order to support and strengthen them; to tell our opinion and listen
to others' opinions; to contribute to the mass processes underway; to be part of this multifaceted social
movement, with our contribution, but with respect to its rules and plurality; and to contact with masses
through our ideas, proposals and militantism, but always with respect to the roles and principles of this
movement”. 
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2017:110)4. As seen in the Figure 2 (Papanikolopoulos et al, 2014)5, where all movement
forces are set according to their political stance (left-right) and their tendency to coalesce
or not, SYRIZA is placed in the leftist-cooperative quadrate. This in-between position and
closeness to the mass of struggling labor forces made SYRIZA more likely to represent
anti-austerity forces or, to put it another way, made the latter more likely to be coopted
and integrated into the program of SYRIZA. Rudig and Karyotis link rise of the support for
SYRIZA in the double elections of 2012 partly due to «their ability to attract opponents
of the austerity policy who are not necessarily radicalized in terms of ideology» (Rudig and
Karyotis, 2014:509).
Figure 2
 Position of organizations in the political spectrum in respect with two axes, left-right and
cooperative-non cooperative
Papanikolopoulos et al, 2014
4 As the authors indicate «SYRIZA has a very open alliance strategy to its left and to its right. On the
one hand, it has established strong ties with social justice groups (DIKTYO), it connects to radical trade
unions, and has embraced the Indignados LPEs. On the other hand, it has participated in the administration
of GSEE/ADEDY and, mainly, has attracted many defected PASOK MPs and rank and file social-democrats
forming the electoral front of SYRIZA/EKM just before the elections of 2012».
5 Their research locus is the existence or absence of links between organizations/groups. It is based on
hundreds questionnaires distributed to core members of 34 organizations/groups participating in the anti-
austerity campaign and in-depth interviews with one representative from each organization/group. Research
questions concern firstly the political positioning and ideology and secondly the collaboration with other
organizations/groups and more particularly whether they share resources or information, do joint actions,
have personal relationships or dual membership, feel solidarity with, and so on. Figure 2 depicts the position
of  the  main  political  networks participating  in  the anti-austerity  campaign  according  to their  members’
responses.
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In other words, the anti-memorandum multitude «adopted» SYRIZA (Douzinas,2014).
This adoption, in our opinion, became clear through a series of instances:
 During  one  of  the  first  anti-memorandum big  protest  events  (March 4,  2010)
SYRIZA's  MPs  appeared  in  front  of  the  Parliament  holding  a  big  banner  and  many
protesters were applauding them.
 Groups of employees in the public sector (employees in the Hellenic Broadcasting
Corporation – ERT, school guards, cleaners of Ministry of Finance), after they got fired by
the pro-memorandum governments, started to participate in SYRIZA's political gatherings
holding banners with their claims.
 In the last anti-memorandum big demonstrations before the elections of January
25, 2015, many employees chose to thicken SYRIZA's blocs instead of marching along with
their unions' leaders. As a result, SYRIZA's blocs were more numerous and denser than
ever before.                                                                           
Insofar the anti-austerity campaign failed to reverse austerity policy and was led to a
deadlock. Every new austerity package was legislated by the parliament despite the huge
popular reactions. Consequently, significant parts of the hard-hit population showed their
discontent turning to the electoral arena and supporting anti-establishment parties and
especially SYRIZA (Papanikolopoulos 2015a; Serdedakis and Koufidi, forthcoming). Spain
and some Latin American countries witnessed similar phenomena (Oikonomakis, 2017).
We  call  this  strategy  «logic  of  assignment»,  as  movement  activists  conceptualize  it.
Oikonomakis (2017) argues that even the latter abandoned prefigurative politics in order
to participate in the electoral process. Based on unofficial interviews and contacts, we can
remark that even an important part of the people that recognize themselves as part of the
antiauthoritarian/anarchist  movement,  who traditionally  are  against  elections,  voted for
SYRIZA in 2012 double elections and/or January 2015. Why? Is this another aspect of the
«logic  of  assignment»?  We  could  hardly  assign  this  kind  of  thinking  to  activists  that
promote «Do It Yourself» logic in practice.     
However, this decision can be seen as a by-product of the unresolved tension between
antithetical  claims,  autonomy and hegemony.  This  kind of  tension was  obvious  in  the
movement of the squares in Greece and Spain (Prentoulis and Thomassen, 2014) . The
conjunction  between  horizontalism  and  representation  seemed  so  difficult  for  the
heterogeneous anti-memorandum multitude that support for anti-memorandum parties
came by itself (Souzas and Iliopoulos, 2015:8). In this context, political outsourcing appears
to protect autonomy from the concerns of hegemony rather than sacrifice prefigurative
politics to institutional ones.
Similarly, SYRIZA adopted anti-memorandum protesters. 
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 It supported almost every social local protest (against privatization of Piraeus port,
privatization of Public Water Utilities of Thessaloniki, new gold mines in Chalkidiki, or in
favor  of  the  occupation  of  a  closed  factory  in  VIOME)  and  Tsipras  visited  protesting
communities.
 It offered legitimization to the activists of «We don't owe, we don't pay» campaign
(2011), calling citizens not to pay «the unjust property tax» called ENFIA and participating
actively  in opening toll  barriers in highways  still  under construction but  already under
exploitation.
 Tsipras visited ERT during its occupation by its fired employees (June 2013), while
he  gave  a  speech  in  Syntagma  Square  trying  to  compose  the  unprecedented  and
«undemocratic» closure of ERT, the social and movement reactions to it, and the need for
governmental change via new elections, in a coherent narrative. 
 Many activists entered SYRIZA's ballots in the 2012, 2014 and 2015 elections and
some  of  them  got  elected:  a)  Konstantina  Kouneva,  cleaner  and  unionist,  who  was
attacked  with  vitriol  in  December  22,  2008,  b)  Anneta  Kavvadia  and  Aglaia  Kyritsi,
journalists of ERT, fired by ND-PASOK government, c) Katrougalos and Douzinas, known
thanks  to the speech they  gave in Syntagma Square during  a  special  event  on Direct
Democracy organized by the Greek Indignados.
Apart from the political developments that facilitated SYRIZA’s rise, some of  SYRIZA’s
features can be seen as movement effects. 
SYRIZA in  the very beginning  was  formed as an umbrella  organization for  smaller
parties, organizations and groups with active participation in the leftist movement. More
particularly, during '00s Synaspismos, a post euro-communist parliamentary party, after a
political «left turn» in its 4th Congress (2004), approached grass-roots movements, while
small left-wing social movement organizations decided to join a coalition with Synaspismos.
After 2004 «left turn» Synaspismos decided to invest in its youth branch development.
Thence,  Synaspismos  Youth  participated  in  every  major  protest  (e.g.  organization  of
European Social Forum in Athens,  student mobilization of 2006-2007, December 2008
riots,  hunger  strike  of  300  immigrants  on  2011)  supporting  them  with  all  kinds  of
resources. Its relative autonomy from the party allowed it to have its own agenda, which
most of the time was more radical than the one of Synaspismos. 
As  for  SYRIZA’s  program,  it  «was  the  outcome  of  both  experience  from  social
struggles  and  experience  and  expertise  acquired  within  the  institutions  of  social  and
political representation» (Spourdalakis, 2013:110). Additionally, many party members with
double partisanship introduce systematically movement issues in the party’s agenda, while
during the pre-election periods progressive activists  are called to contribute to party’s
program.  In  2012 and 2015  elections,  in  contrary  with  the  mainstream governmental
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parties, SYRIZA organized open rallies just about everywhere using  «the know-how and
the  techniques  of  political  mobilization  acquired  in  its  involvement  in  the  social
movements» (ibid:114).
SYRIZA's description as a «mass connective party» (ibid:103) relies upon its ambition
to connect social initiatives and movement activities with similar goals and provides some
evidence that, in majoritarian democracies, the transformation of existing parties by social
movements is easier than the rise of new parties coming out of social movements.
ELECTORAL SUCCESS AS A MOVEMENT EFFECT MEANS “POPULISM”?
By assuming that both party’s features and the massive political mobilization led to the rise
of  SYRIZA does  not  mean  that  we  approach  this  phenomenon  as  a  typical  case  of
populism.  Kriesi  and  Pappas  (2015:11-12)  argue  that  Great  Recession  provides  an
opportunity for both right-wing and the left-wing populism, expecting left-wing populism
to get its chance especially in the countries hardest hit by the crisis like Greece. Their
definition of populism includes «the existence of two homogeneous groups – ‘the people’
and  ‘the  elite’,  the  antagonistic  relationship  between  the  two,  the  idea  of  popular
sovereignty,  and  a  ‘Manichean  outlook’  that  opposes  the  positive  valorization  of  ‘the
people’ combined with the denigration of ‘the elite» (ibid:7).
This definition –as most of definitions of populism- seems to us problematic for at
least three reasons. First, we cannot easily imagine how an organized political force can
make  democratic  politics  without  addressing  the  only  legitimizing  authority  of  the
democratic  era  (and  area),  the  people,  and  without  trying  to  define  the  optimum
boundary between  «us» and «them». As Jasper suggests «demonization of enemies and
adulation of fellows are common activities in political conflict of all sorts, generating an
emotional energy important for retaining recruits to a movement. This kind of polarization
seems a natural cognitive and emotional process […] of the kind that cognitive psychology
is good at grasping» (Jasper, 2004:241). In democratic states that power derives from the
people, claiming for power means trying to represent people vis a vis power holders. In
contrast, once in office parties ask for «consensus». It seems that adversary framing serves
political challengers, while consensual framing serves whoever defends status quo.  Second,
the elite frequently adopts the Manichean schema of «people-elite» pretending that it is
the real  representative  of  people’s  interest,  while  the populist  opposition is  a kind of
political,  ideological  or  economic  elite,  which  tries  to  take  advantage  of  people’s
discontent. Anti-populism is in fact elite's populism. Third, the idea that an explanation of
crisis based on the unwillingness and incapability of political and economic elites to deal
with crisis on behalf of the middle and the lower classes is a priori incorrect makes it
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difficult for us to distinct populism’s definition from elite’s framing. It is obvious that both
the economic  and political  crisis  have causes leading  us  some way to the role of  the
elite(s),  national  or  international.  That’s  why  it  is  misleading  to speak  about «populist
communication style» which puts an emphasis on the fundamental role of the people and
claims that the people have been betrayed by those in charge (Kriesi and Pappas, 2015).
Characterizing everyone who blames the elite and/or supports a social majority’s unified
interest as «populist» is serving a reactionary rhetoric rather than science. As Stavrakakis
and Katsambekis stress, at the same time that we witness «the proliferation of new types
of  'anti-populist'  discourses  aiming  at  the  discursive  policing  and  the  political
marginalization of emerging protest movements against the politics of austerity,  especially
in countries such as Greece, Spain and Portugal», in the academia «it has […] become
commonplace to study populism and extremism together». (Stavrakakis and Katsabekis,
2014:134).
Regarding populism as ideological and political strategy, we could note that apart from
«the notion of people as sovereign» (that is a core notion of western constitutions, if not
of Modernity itself),  SYRIZA didn’t share the other components of a populist ideology
(monolithic conception of the people, exclusion of ‘others’, illiberal vision of democracy)
(Kriesi and Pappas, 2015). In contrary with Pantazopoulos (2013), who considers both
SYRIZA's  and  Golden  Dawn's  discourse  as  «national-populist»,  Stavrakakis  and
Katsambekis  (2014:135)  distinguish  the  «people»  of  the  extreme  right  (xenophobic,
exclusionary, passive) from the 'people' of the left (plural, inclusive and active). Similarly,
SYRIZA’s political strategy was not based on a personalistic leader’s capacity to mobilize in
an unmediated way large numbers of mostly unorganized 
followers  (Kriesi  and  Pappas,  2015),  because  of  both  unwillingness  and  inability6.
Besides,  contrary  to the  «top  down» strategy  of  the  new right,  new left  relies  on a
«bottom  up»  strategy  (Kriesi,  2015b).  Furthermore,  we  disagree  with  some  scholars
(Pantazopoulos,  2013;  Aslanidis  2016) who think  of  almost  every massive  contentious
movement campaign as populist, especially when protesters with different ideological and
political  identities  coalesce to fight against  power holders'  alliance (mainstream parties,
economic  elite,  mass  media  owners  etc.).  This  kind  of  «theory»  does  not  make  but
6 Alexis Tsipras mentioned in a speech in Ioannina (21 March 2014): “We believe in movements’ power,
in social groups’ action, in social struggles, in unitary initiatives that accelerate social developments. We do
not therefore believe that we are infallible […] or saviors […]. But the only who can secure [political]
reversal  is you. And this is not going to happen by sitting on the couch”. Furthermore, we read in the
political resolution of SYRIZA’s first Congress (12 July 2013): “a leftist government's goals cannot be met via
a delegation rationale. Only the wider wave for democratic reversal which is going to bring Left in power can
guarantee the path not only of government, but of the country itself”.
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offering certification to elites' anti-populist populism by presenting consensual politics as
the only responsible and popular fronts as irrational mobs.
MOVEMENT  RECESSION  AS  AN  EFFECT  OF  SYRIZA'S  ELECTORAL
SUCCESS 
At this point we would like to respond to a couple of possible questions: a) Given that
massiveness of protest events dropped substantially during the last two years before the
elections of 25th January 2015 (Papanikolopoulos, 2015a), while SYRIZA was increasing its
political leverage, how we can speak about «electoral success as a movement effect»? b)
SYRIZΑ's electoral success on 20 September 2015 was equally a movement effect?
The decrease of social movements activity from 2013 must be seen as a result of 1)
exhaustion of the available citizens’ resources after three years of escalating anti-austerity
mobilization (2010-2012), 2)  disillusionment regarding their collective capacity to prevent
troika and Greek government from imposing new packages of austerity measures two of
them where already  legislated  combined  with  several  other  austerity  laws and  3)  the
transposition  of  their  hopes  in  the  electoral  level,  namely  the  logic  of  assignment
(Papanikolopoulos, 2015a) This kind of substitutionalism can be seen as movement politics
by other means. SYRIZA managed to act for years as movement's spokesperson, given
that it could use easily a movement type language. Similarly, Greek Indignados «adopted»
SYRIZA because it was speaking the same language and was transforming their agenda
into a political program. In other words, SYRIZA's political leverage increased not despite
current movement  recession but by virtue of  the previous  intense movement  activity,
which made reciprocal «adoption» possible.
SYRIZA formed a coalition government after its victory on 25 January 2015 and a
further movement recession appeared as an electoral effect. After long-lasting negotiations
with Greece's creditors SYRIZA's government signed a new 3rd Memorandum in contrary
with its promises for putting an end to the austerity policies. In such a context, it makes
no sense to speak of SYRIZA's electoral victory on 20 September 20157 as a movement
effect  too.  However,  the victory  of  «No» in  the referendum of 5 th July  20158,  which
SYRIZA's government called, and the polarization between the «No» and «Yes» camps,
which was expressed by rival gatherings in the center of Athens (more than 150.000 vs
more than 50.000 people), deepen further the boundary between anti-memorandum and
pro-memorandum forces (mainstream parties, economic elite, mass media). The defeat of
7 SYRIZA  secured  35,5%  of  the  votes  and  145  parliamentary  seats  out  of  300  and  formed  a
governmental coalition with ANEL, which secured another 3,7% of the votes and 10 seats in the Parliament. 
8 The dilemma was “Yes or No to the austerity measures proposed by our lenders”. 61,3% voted “No”,
while 38,7% voted “Yes”.
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these latter in the referendum polls anticipated their defeat in the forthcoming elections.
The pro – «No» popular mobilization did not give a boost to SYRIZA in the elections of
20 September 2015,  but condemned the political  representatives  of  «Yes» to another
mandate in the opposition. 
Greece, as many Latin-American countries  (Almeida,  2015),  witnessed a substantial
decline  of  movement  activity  after  left/central  left  parties  took  power.  Oikonomakis
(2017)  proposes  an  explanation  focusing  on  a  supposed  «carrot  and  stick»  strategy
adopted  by  SYRIZA toward  contention.  His  explanation  seems  only  partially  correct.
While repression levels  declined immediately and conspicuously,  new opportunities  did
not transform into intensification of collective action. Instead, the logic of assignment and
invested  hopes  on  the  new  government  led  to  inaction.  Some  first  (minor  and/or
symbolic) positive measures implemented by government and the ongoing negotiations
with Greece's international lenders led Greek people to adopt a waiting stance. Of course,
SYRIZA once  in  government  adopted  more  moderate  positions  in  a  series  of  issues
(Oikonomakis, 2017) as it is expected for a governmental party that «has to take into
account  various  stakeholders  and  appeal  to  the  median  voter»  (Hutter  et  al,
forthcoming:12).  After  six  months  of  harsh  negotiations  with  Troika  (IMF,  ECB,  EU),
SYRIZA finally signed a third bailout agreement accompanied by new austerity measures. 
Thence, its political programme before the September 2015 elections was reoriented
towards the reduction of the most harmful impacts of the subsequent neoliberal packages
and the implementation of equivalent counter-measures on behalf of the most vulnerable.
In this  context,  Greek people gave to SYRIZA-ANEL coalition a second governmental
chance  in  September  2015  elections.  However,  continuation  of  the  austerity  policy
triggered new anti-austerity protests, yet without the massiveness witnessed in the first
years  of  the  crisis  (2010-2012).  This  can  be  explained  in  four  ways:  1)  Once  in
government,  SYRIZA's  social  movement  partyism  strategy  came  to  an  end,  as  party
members withdrew from protesting against government, 2) after the signature of the third
bailout  agreement  by  a  left-leaning  party,  «memorandum-anti-memorandum»  political
cleavage lost salience, 3) many people recognized that the international power structure
was very unfavorable for a leftist government to promote substantial changes, 4) voters
and adherents of SYRIZA were disappointed by both movement and institutional politics,
especially after SYRIZA’s setback vis a vis Greece's lenders.
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THE  INTERPLAY  BETWEEN  SOCIAL  MOVEMENTS,  PARTIES,  AND
ELECTIONS 
The literature on the interactions between movements, parties, and electoral outcomes is
growing and SYRIZA's case has much to offer in the relative debate.  As Hutter et al.
(forthcoming:6) notice,  this research field is organized around four issues:  a) parties as
movement allies in the political process approach, b) parties and movements as key actors
involved in the articulation of new social cleavages, c) agenda-setting power of protest, and
d)  interplay  between  movements  and  elections  in  the  contentious  politics  approach.
Indeed, the anti-austerity campaign created the necessary preconditions for the electoral
and political rise of SYRIZA, thus the emergence of a new political boundary between
pro- and anti- memorandum forces and a subsequent majoritarian socio-political category
that could be transformed into a privileged electoral pool for SYRIZA. The position of the
latter between contention and convention gave it the opportunity to function as a channel
of transferring protest claims into the institutional  arena. Besides, apart from being the
parliamentary  lawyer  of  protesters,  SYRIZA  deployed  a  full-scale  social  movement
partyism strategy by providing crucial resources to the anti-austerity campaign. 
As for  the fourth strand already mentioned,  case under examination appears even
more fruitful. Mc Adam and Tarrow (2010:533-534) have specified six mechanisms that
link movement actors to routine political actors in electoral campaigns. They argue that 1)
movement  tactics  and  innovations  can  be  adopted  by  parties  as  electoral  tools,  2)
movements join electoral coalitions or turn into political parties, 3) movements  engage in
proactive mobilization in the 
context  of  an  electoral  campaign,  4)  movements  engage  in  reactive  electoral
mobilization, 5) movements polarize internally parties triggering disputes between radicals
and moderates, and 6) shifts in electoral regimes in the long term promote left-wing or
right-wing mobilizations. Some of these linkages are present in our case (1,  5),  others
absent (3, 4), while others need further elaboration (2) or rejection (6). 
As already said, SYRIZA's in-between strategy was proved very effective in times of
crisis of representation. It is dubious, however, whether SYRIZA could fulfill such a task
without being helped by its specific traits formed throughout years in close connection
with  social  movements  (1).  Similarly,  splits  within  SYRIZA  resulted  from  polarization
between more movement-oriented  fractions  and more institutional  ones.  In  2010 the
splitting  group  of  moderates  disagreed  with  SYRIZA's  unreserved  support  to  radical
movements,  while in the aftermath of the signature of the third memorandum in July-
August,  2015, among the splitting groups were Maoist and Trotskyist  social movement
organizations that had entered SYRIZA's coalition a decade ago (5). As for the proactive
electoral  mobilizations,  we  have  already  mentioned  groups  of  fired  civil  servants
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participating in SYRIZA's political gatherings holding banners with their claims, as well as
others choosing to thicken SYRIZA's blocs instead of marching along with their unions'
leaders in the last anti-memorandum big demonstrations before the elections of January
25, 2015. However, it would be misleading to argue that anti-austerity protesters as such
intervene  massively  in  the  electoral  campaign  in  favor  of  SYRIZA (3).  On  the  other,
reactive  electoral  mobilizations  were  absent,  since  the  electoral  results  were  never
disputed (4). 
As  for  the  second  issue  Mc  Adam  and  Tarrow  notice  that  movements  can  join
electoral coalitions or turn into political parties themselves. Kriesi, in his turn, argues that
«in  majoritarian systems,  instead  of  creating  his  own party,  a  challenger  has  a  strong
incentive  to  introduce  his  demands  into  the  program of  one  of  the  existing  parties»
(Kriesi, 2015b:669). In the same line, Giugni and Lorenzini consider that «citizens who seek
clear  answers  to  the  long-lasting  recession  may  support  radicalized  political  parties»
(Giugni and Lorenzini, 2015:37). SYRIZA is not a new party formed by social movements.
It  is  a  party  transformed  by  social  movements,  since  many  minor  social  movement
organizations  coalesced  with  a  post  euro-communist  parliamentary  party  in  order  to
broaden the political leverage of the Left. It is a party that «turned left» and invested in
movement activity. Thus, our argumentation does not seek simply to confirm the idea that
protest activity can reshape party systems. It rather underlines the possibility for the to
turn to social movements, rather than come out of them. That’s why SYRIZA triggered so
intense discussion inside European Left and the European movements. However, stressing
that both party’s features and the massive political mobilization led to the spectacular rise
of  SYRIZA  does  not  mean  that  this  phenomenon  can  be  explained  in  terms  of
«populism». In contrast, instead of a top-down process we witnessed a bottom-up one,
with the anti-memorandum forces «adopting» SYRIZA. The «logic of assignment» and
«political  outsourcing»  associated  with  this  very  process  constitute  a  distinct  kind  of
relations between movements and parties, which underline the possibility for movement
mobilization to replace party mobilization in times of crisis of representation. Movements
can «adopt» parties.
Unlikely this linkage mechanism, the causal  relationship between solidification of an
enduring electoral regime and the conditioning of prospects for successful mobilizations
(6) could hardly be accepted. Mc Adam and Tarrow in their insightful study (2010) have
underlined the reinforcement of left-wing mobilizations under Democratic administration
as well as the rise of rightist movements in the Republican era. In contrast, in Greece left-
wing social  and political  forces are traditionally  among the main organizers of popular
mobilizations no matter who governs (Papanikolopoulos, 2015b, 2016), while right-wing
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mobilizations are traditionally marginal. Besides, as we indicated, increased opportunities
for successful mobilization under left-wing administration
can  promote  the  «logic  of  assignment»  rather  than  increase  mobilization.  This
assumption fits with Van Dyke's suggestion, according to which threats associated with a
political opponent in power are more likely to trigger protest than opportunities linked to
friendly governments (Van Dyke, 2001).
Finally,  we could add a  seventh  linkage mechanism in  Mc Adam and Tarrow's  list:
movements can trigger snap elections. It is well accepted that movement pressure and
especially the biggest anti-governmental demonstration (300-500.000 participants) of the
post-junta era  on 12 February 2012 triggered snap elections  of  May 2012 leading  to
SYRIZA’s rise. This proves that protest cycles are not unilaterally influenced by electoral
cycles, but they can on their turn give shape to these later. 
CONCLUSION
SYRIZA's  electoral  successes  between 2012 and 2015 triggered intense discussions  in
both political and academic levels. These electoral successes did not take place only due to
economic crisis, Alexis Tsipras’ charismatic leadership or SYRIZA's strategy and political
message, or SYRIZA’s particular ideological and organizational features. On the one hand,
economic  crisis  made  punishment  of  mainstream parties  an  international  trait  of  the
electoral outcomes throughout last years, but only in Greece led to such a spectacular rise
of a minor leftist party. On the other hand, SYRIZA's features, strategy and message have
been  developed  on  the  grounds  of  its  movement  activity.  Furthermore,  the  external
political conditions which SYRIZA seems to take advantage of were the immediate results
of an intensive movement campaign. In other words, spectacular rise of SYRIZA was to an
important extent a movement effect. 
The anti-austerity campaign created the necessary preconditions for the electoral and
political rise of SYRIZA, namely the emergence of a new political boundary between pro-
and anti-Memorandum forces and a subsequent majoritarian socio-political category that
could be transformed into a privileged electoral pool for SYRIZA. The position of this
latter between contention and convention, institutional and non-institutional action, gave it
the  opportunity  to  function  as  a  channel  of  transferring  protest  claims  into  the
institutional arena. This in-between strategy was proved very effective in times of crisis of
representation. It is dubious, however, whether SYRIZA could fulfill such a task without
being helped by its specific traits formed throughout years in close connection with social
movements.
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Case  under  examination  has  crucial  theoretical  implications.  SYRIZA’s  bottom-up
strategy challenges the populism hypothesis, according to which SYRIZA’s rise is due to
populist mobilization. In contrast, the anti-memorandum multitude “adopted” SYRIZA via
«logic  of  assignment».  This  strategy  constitutes  a  distinct  kind  of  relations  between
movements and parties, beyond the formation of parties by movements and vice versa,
which underlines the possibility for movement mobilization to replace party mobilization
in times of crisis of representation. Turn to electoral support for SYRIZA led to substantial
decline of anti-austerity protest both before and after SYRIZA came to power, indicating
that  increased  political  opportunities  under  left-wing  administration  can  promote  the
«logic of assignment» rather than increased mobilization. 
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